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OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN? 
In the 20th century, the revolution of Quantum Mechanics (QM) challenged the 
Laplacean dogma of deterministic physics, suggesting that, at its most fundamen-
tal level, Nature might contain irreducible elements of chance or indeterminism 
(according to some interpretations) with wide-ranging consequences in various 
domains of metaphysics. One such domain, in which the consequences of physi-
cal indeterminism have been studied, is the metaphysics of Free Will, because 
indeterminisms in nature might be thought to provide the leeway for a libertarian 
conception of Free Will (see Popper and Eccles 1977; Kane 1996; Hodgson 2002).
Another domain in which physical indeterminism might have interesting conse-
quences is the metaphysics of God’s relation to the created world, as a provident 
creator and an intervener (author of miracles). The implications of chance on the 
conception of God’s Providence started to be investigated at least in the 1970s 
(as far as I am aware), for example in Peter Geach’s “The Ordainer of the Lottery” 
(1977, chap. 6) and then (independently) by David Bartholomew (Bartholomew 
1984; 2008) and Peter van Inwagen (van Inwagen 1988; 2006).
More recently, Dariusz Łukasiewicz has taken over this important project of 
investigation, dedicating to it a whole monograph in Polish (Łukasiewicz 2014), 
then a series of papers in English which (I suppose) give insights about the main 
arguments and results of the monograph (Łukasiewicz 2015; 2017; 2018). (Unfor-
tunately, I was unable to read it; a translation in English would be a great service 
to the profession.)
Jean-Baptiste Guillon is Assistant Professor at the University of Navarra; address for corre-
spondence: Universidad de Navarra, 31009 Pamplona, Navarra, Spain; email: guillonjeanbaptiste@
gmail.com; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3868-4351.
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Łukasiewicz’s paper “Divine Providence and Chance in the world” is the most 
developed and thorough presentation of his views on the topic in English, reusing 
some elements of the previous (shorter) papers, elaborating on them and setting 
them in a more general and systematic framework.
The starting point, and the centre, of the paper is the question whether the (sci-
entific) data of chance disprove the existence of a (provident) God—the “Argument 
from Chance.” And Łukasiewicz defends a negative answer: divine Providence is 
in fact compatible with the data of chance.
But in the course of responding to this specific challenge, Łukasiewicz also deals 
with many other traditional topics and discussions (the problem of evil, problem 
of Free Will and Providence, problem of miracles, etc.). In fact, it seems to me 
that this thorough paper undertakes a more ambitious purpose than just responding 
to the Argument from Chance: the larger purpose is to draw all lessons that can 
be drawn (in natural theology) from the data of natural chance and to elaborate 
a positive and constructive picture of Divine Providence. As I read the paper, the 
Argument of Chance is just one of the dialectical problems to which Łukasiewicz 
provides a personal contribution.
My reconstruction of Łukasiewicz’s discussion will not follow exactly the sec-
tions of the paper, but I think it will cover the main theses and arguments.
In short, the scientific data of natural chance might have a positive or a nega-
tive impact on natural theology: it might be thought to offer an argument in favour 
of the existence of God (or a refutation of objections against the existence of 
God), or it might be thought to offer an argument against the existence of God. 
Łukasiewicz enters into both possible discussions, and more precisely addresses 
three arguments:1
1. Some philosophers argue that, given the fundamental physical constants of 
the universe, the existence of life was a matter of (very unlikely) chance, and that 
this fact constitutes evidence in favour of the existence of God. This is usually 
called the Fine-Tuning Argument, and it is the first way in which (some kind of) 
chance might constitute a (positive) case for God’s existence.
2. Another way in which (some kind of) chance could play in favour of the 
traditional picture of God is that (according to some other philosophers) the Inde-
terminacies of fundamental particles (shown by QM) could be thought to provide 
a leeway for God’s miraculous interventions—QM would prove that miracles are 
possible without breaking the laws of Nature and therefore one argument against 
the existence of God would be defeated (namely the argument from physical 
1 Even though these three lines of argument interact in complex ways, I think it is better to 
distinguish them in order to keep the dialectics clear.
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determinism to the impossibility of a miraculous intervener). Let us call this the 
Argument of Quantum Miracles. This is the second way in which (some kind of) 
chance might constitute a positive case for God’s existence—not, this time, as 
a direct argument for God’s existence, but as a defeater of an argument against 
God’s existence (or the existence of an intervening God).
3. Finally, some philosophers might think that the existence of chance in the 
world is incompatible with the existence of God, if God is to be conceived as 
a Provident God, that is, a God who is in control of every single detail of His 
creation. This is the Argument from Chance properly speaking (in Łukasiewicz’s 
terminology), and it is an argument against the existence of God.
Łukasiewicz provides a negative verdict for all three arguments. According to 
him: a) chance does not prove the existence of God (the Fine-Tuning Argument is 
flawed), b) chance is not necessary to prove the possibility of miraculous interven-
tions (there can be miraculous interventions even without physical indeterminacies), 
and c) chance does not disprove the existence of God either (the Argument from 
Chance is flawed as well).
If we stopped there, we could have the impression that (according to Łukasiewicz) 
the data of chance have no impact—neither positive nor negative—on our concep-
tion of Divine Providence. But in fact, Łukasiewicz thinks that the data of chance 
has a huge impact in this domain, and to understand this point we have to develop 
his response to the third argument a bit more, namely the Argument from Chance 
(which, once again, is at the centre of Łukasiewicz’s paper).
Łukasiewicz argues that the Argument from Chance does not disprove the ex-
istence of Providence in general; but it does disprove one picture of Providence, 
namely the picture of divine Providence as being “detailed” or “fine-grained,” i.e., 
encompassing and controlling every single detail of the creation. As I understand 
Łukasiewicz, he argues that this picture of Providence is indeed refuted (or at 
least rendered highly improbable) by the scientific data of chance. But according 
to Łukasiewicz, there is another possible model of Providence, namely a “coarse-
grained” model, and this other picture is not disproved by chance. Therefore, the 
lesson of the discussion of the Argument from Chance is not just that the argument 
does not work (to disprove the existence of God), but also that it works as an 
argument in favour of the coarse-grained model of Providence (as opposed to the 
fine-grained model). And as a matter of fact, Łukasiewicz welcomes this conclu-
sion, because the coarse-grained model is the model he favours for independent 
theological and a priori reasons (sec. 5). Therefore, the scientific data of Chance 
come as a welcome empirical confirmation of an independently preferred theology.
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The picture of Chance and Divine Providence provided by Łukasiewicz is 
impressive and careful, and there are lots of points I agree with. In the present 
paper I will focus on some points with which I disagree in order to enrich the 
debate with Łukasiewicz. (It is very probable that some objections I will make 
find a response in Łukasiewicz’s monograph in Polish, and I apologize in advance 
for this inconvenience.) In short, below are the points I will raise.
In the first two sections, I will make brief remarks about the two peripheral 
arguments, namely:
I. Does the Fine-Tuning Argument succumb to Łukasiewicz’s objections?
II. What should we think of Łukasiewicz’s model of miracles (which does not rely on 
physical indeterminacies)?
Then I will turn to the central discussion of the Argument from Chance, and 
I will discuss the following points:
IIIa.  Are the data of Evolutionary Biology relevant as scientific data of chance or 
should we concentrate on just QM data?
IIIb.  Do physical indeterminacies disprove the fine-grained model of Providence?
IIIc.  Do physical indeterminacies prove the coarse-grained model of Providence?
IIId.  Do we have independent (theological, a priori) reasons to embrace the coarse-
grained model of Providence?
My main claim will be that it seems to me that Łukasiewicz might be neglecting 
an intermediate model of Providence, which is neither (absolutely) fine-grained, 
nor as coarse-grained as Łukasiewicz has it, and that this intermediate model is 
both compatible with the scientific data of chance and (arguably) more plausible 
on theological grounds than Łukasiewicz’s coarse-grained model.
I. DOES CHANCE PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF GOD?  
THE FINE-TUNING ARGUMENT
One question that Łukasiewicz raises in (Łukasiewicz 2015) and in section 3 of 
“Divine Providence and Chance” is whether some kind of chance could represent 
an argument in favour of God’s existence. And he interprets the Fine-Tuning Ar-
gument and the Argument from Intelligent Design as being two versions of such 
a general argument, which he calls the “Argument from Small Probabilities.” This 
is because the Fine-Tuning Argument and the Argument from Intelligent Design 
seem to take as their first and main premise a certain datum of “chance” in the 
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sense of “an event whose probability is very small” (sense C5 for Łukasiewicz) 
and conclude, from this datum of chance, that there is a God.
I have reservations about this presentation of the debate, and I am tempted 
to take the discussion of the Arguments from Small Probabilities as largely in-
dependent of the rest of the paper. The main problem is that these arguments do 
not take a datum of chance as their main premise. These arguments do not have 
the following form:
(1)  event E (the possibility of life in the cosmos, or of the emergence of the bacterial 
flagellum) had a very small probability of occurrence,
(2)  therefore there is a God.
Rather, they have the following form:
(1′)  If there were no divine intervener, event E would have had a very small prob-
ability of occurrence,
(1′′)  if there were a divine intervener, event E would have had a significantly higher 
probability of occurrence,
(2)  therefore (it is very probable that) there is a divine intervener (and event E was 
not chancy or very improbable).
In other words, the arguments from small probabilities are not arguments from 
chance (to the existence of God), they are arguments against chance.
But independently of the precise dialectical situation of these arguments in the 
general framework, my main worry is with the objection that Łukasiewicz makes 
against them, and more precisely against the Fine-Tuning Argument. (I have no 
quarrel with Łukasiewicz’s rejection of the Argument from Intelligent Design of 
the biological realm, which is not, I believe, as important and respected in con-
temporary philosophical circles as the Fine-Tuning Argument.)
What is Łukasiewicz’s objection against the Fine-Tuning Argument? Here, 
Łukasiewicz follows rather closely Bartholomew’s discussion (Bartholomew 2008, 
79–85).
Bartholomew and Łukasiewicz say that there are two questionable steps in the 
Fine-Tuning Argument, or more precisely in the establishment of its first premise, 
namely the premise that says that the probability of some life-permitting event 
or state of affairs was fantastically low (on the hypothesis that there is no divine 
intervener). The question is: How do we determine the probability of these events 
or states of affairs? The defender of the Fine-Tuning Argument is supposed to 
respond as follows:
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First it is argued that the probability of any one parameter falling within the desired 
range must be infinitesimally small. Secondly, the probability of them all falling within 
their respective ranges, obtained by multiplying these very small probabilities together, 
is fantastically small. (Bartholomew 2008, 84)
And Bartholomew and Łukasiewicz respond that both steps of this reasoning are 
doubtful. First, “it is not clear enough whether the cosmic constants are independent 
of each other”; second, “our common intuition that all possible values of cosmo-
logical constants are equally probable … draws on the principle of insufficient 
reason: if there is no reason to prefer one quantity to others, then all of them 
should be treated as equally probable. However, the application of this principle 
to the cosmic … evolution is questionable” (Łukasiewicz, this issue).
In order to respond, I would like to start by setting aside the first objection: as 
Bartholomew himself notices explicitly, whether or not the first step is question-
able (the independence of the constants), the defender of the Fine-Tuning Argu-
ment does not need to rely on this first step for his argument, because each one 
of the phenomena of cosmic Fine-Tuning (for instance the Fine-Tuning of the 
strong nuclear force), even taken individually, already has a fantastically small 
probability.2 Therefore, I take this first objection to be irrelevant to the discussion.
The only substantial objection that Łukasiewicz makes against the Fine-Tuning 
Argument is the idea that, in order to get to the relevant probabilistic judgment, 
we need to rely on the “principle of insufficient reason,” which is deemed to be 
“questionable.”
This objection is somewhat surprising in that it is not one of the prominent 
objections usually made to refute the Fine-Tuning Argument in the contemporary 
discussions. For instance, it does not appear in the lists of objections of (Hawthorne 
and Isaacs 2018) or (Friederich 2018). Nevertheless the objection is discussed in 
longer treatments of the argument, such as Robin Collins’ long paper “The Teleo-
logical Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe” (Collins 
2009, sec. 3.3.2).
So what is the problem exactly with the “principle of insufficient reason” (or 
the “principle of indifference” in Collins’ terminology) and how does Collins 
respond to this problem? Bartholomew does not tell us much about the nature of 
the problem. He only states that “the application of this principle is fraught with 
problems and it does not take much ingenuity to construct examples which show 
its absurdity” (Bartholomew, ibid.), but he does not give any development or 
2 Here is Bartholomew on this point: “surely something might be salvaged because there is so 
little freedom in the determination of each parameter treated individually” (ibid.).
 DIVINE PROVIDENCE: FINE-GRAINED, COARSE-GRAINED 77
reference to satisfy our curiosity. Collins, on the other hand, explains what kind 
of (counter-)examples are at play here: 
Consider the case in which we are told that a factory produces cubes between 0 and 
10 meters in length, but in which we are given no information about what lengths it 
produces. Using [the standard Principle of Indifference], we shall now calculate the 
epistemic probability of the cube being between 9 and 10 meters in length. Such a cube 
could be characterized either by its length, L, or its volume, V. If we characterize it by 
its length, then since the range [9,10] is one-tenth of the possible range of lengths of 
the cube, the probability would be 1/10. If, however, we characterize it by its volume, 
the ratio of the range of volumes is: [1,000 − 93]/1,000 = [1,000 − 729]/1,000 = 0.271, 
which yields almost three times the probability as for the case of using length. Thus, 
the probability we obtain depends on what mathematically equivalent variable we use 
to characterize the situation. (Collins 2009, 234–35)
Of course, if the “probability” of the cube being between 9 and 10 meters—cal-
culated by the Principle of Indifference—depends on the arbitrary choice of the 
relevant variable (length or volume), this shows that the Principle of Indiffer-
ence cannot give any objective response about what this probability is. So the 
(standard) Principle of Indifference cannot allow us to determine the probability 
of anything. This objection against the Principle of Indifference is known as the 
Bertrand Paradox.
What prevents us from determining the probability of the cube being between 
9 and 10 meters is the arbitrariness of the choice we have to make between one 
variable (length) or another (volume). But what about cases in which there is 
a non-arbitrary selection of the relevant variable, cases where a natural variable 
can be determined? In such cases (and such cases alone), Collins argues, there is 
no objection against using the Principle of Indifference. In other words, the objec-
tion coming from Bertrand Paradox has no effect against the “restricted Principle 
of Indifference,” which Collins formulates as follows:
… when we have no reason to prefer any one value of a variable p over another in 
some range R, we should assign equal epistemic probabilities to equal ranges of p that 
are in R, given that p constitutes a “natural variable”. (Collins 2009, 234)
Not only is there no paradox with the restricted Principle of Indifference, but there 
are extremely strong reasons to accept it, as Collins develops. First, from the general 
perspective of probability theory, “an astonishing number of extremely complex 
problems in probability theory have been solved, and usefully so, by calculations 
based entirely on the assumption of equiprobable alternatives [that is, the Principle 
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of Indifference]” (Weatherford 1982, 35). Second, and concerning scientific practice 
more specifically, the use of some variables as natural variables is a very common 
and useful practice for scientists: “for purposes of theory confirmation, scientists 
often take those variables that occur in the simplest formulation of a theory as 
the natural variables” (Collins 2009, 235). And nothing more is needed to apply 
the restricted Principle of Indifference to deliver probabilities for the Fine-Tuning 
Argument, since the constants at play (the strong nuclear force, gravity, etc.) are 
precisely “variables that occur in the simplest formulation” of fundamental physics.
There is one point on which Bartholomew and Łukasiewicz are probably right 
in this discussion: it is the fact that we cannot plausibly apply the Principle of 
Indifference to calibrate the probability of biological scenarios (for example the 
emergence of the bacterial flagellum) as William Dembski and other defenders of 
the Argument from Intelligent Design try to do. For these scenarios, we probably 
have no reason to think that the variables considered by Dembski and others are 
natural variables. But the case of the Fine-Tuning Argument is very different here 
since the variables that it relies on are precisely those that fundamental physics 
considers as natural.
Collins states that the problem of Bertrand paradox has been a considered as 
a pressing issue in the past: “Historically, this has been thought of as the fatal 
blow to the general applicability of the Principle of Indifference, except in those 
cases in which a natural variable can be determined” (ibid.). But now that we 
can make certain that the relevant variables (for the Fine-Tuning Argument) are 
indeed natural variables, and used as such in scientific investigations themselves, 
it seems that the whole objection cannot stand anymore.
This is (as far as I can tell) the reason why most contemporary presentations 
of the Fine-Tuning debate do not even mention the problem of the Principle of 
Indifference in their lists of significant objections. As Hawthorne and Isaacs very 
quickly state, “the physically respectable measures [those formulated with the 
natural variables] are the probabilities that are appropriate for physics in a natu-
ralistic context. So in a naturalistic context, divergence [between the probabilities 
and] the physically respectable measures can only be a rejection of physics itself” 
(Hawthorne and Isaacs 2018, 145).
I am not trying to argue here that the Fine-Tuning Argument is definitely suc-
cessful (there are, after all, other important objections, like the Multiverse objec-
tion). Nor am I claiming that it is in principle impossible to revive the objection 
related to the Principle of Indifference (or the Principle of Insufficient Reason). 
But in view of recent debates, I would like to know more about why Łukasiewicz 
is dissatisfied with Collins’ response to this objection.
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II. DOES CHANCE PROVE THE POSSIBILITY OF MIRACLES?  
OR: WHAT’S WRONG WITH TRADITIONAL INTERVENTIONISM?
Another line of debate that Łukasiewicz studied in his paper (2018) and again 
in section 4 of the present paper (even though it is not the central point here) is 
the question of the possibility of miracles. The idea that God acts or intervenes 
in the course of history seems to be an essential tenet of the classical concept of 
God. A God who simply created the world and then let it evolve without ever 
intervening again is what Plantinga calls a “hand-off theology” (Plantinga 2012, 
72) and is incompatible with classical theism. As Łukasiewicz notes, “the very 
existence of miracles is based on the Biblical testimony” (footnote 33). Therefore, 
any argument against the possibility of miracles and divine interventions in the 
course of history is tantamount to a proof of the non-existence of God (understood 
in the traditional way). But there is an objection against the possibility of miracles, 
an objection endorsed by some scientists and even some theologians.3 Plantinga 
summarizes the problem as follows:
The problem as these people see it, is this. Science discovers and endorses natural 
laws; if God did miracles or acted specially in the world, he would have to contra-
vene these laws and miraculously intervene; and that is incompatible with science. 
(Plantinga 2012, 75)
But in fact this argument presupposes the Laplacean picture of the natural laws 
as being complete and deterministic. And since the quantum revolution, it seems 
on the contrary that the laws of nature leave some leeway or “chance” open—or 
more precisely: the laws of nature seem to be merely probabilistic and not deter-
ministic. Some philosophers have thought that this leeway or chance is precisely 
what we need to undermine the Argument against Miracles. 
This solution to the problem of miracles has been called “epistemic deism,” 
and it has the great advantage that it allows for the possibility of miracles without 
requiring that God “break the laws of nature.” As Łukasiewicz summarizes: 
According to epistemic deists, by operating at the quantum level, God acts in the 
physical universe without breaking or violating the indeterministic and probabilistic 
laws of nature. (sec. 4.1)
3 For references to these scientists and theologians, see for instance those quoted in (Plantinga 
2012, 69–75).
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But that is not the only possible reaction to the problem of miracles. A more tradi-
tional reaction, appropriately called “traditional interventionism” by Łukasiewicz, 
sees no problem in God’s intervening in violation of the laws of nature:
Traditional interventionism holds that God has intervened in the world by breaking or 
suspending the laws of nature. (sec. 4.2.1, note 33)
In his paper, Łukasiewicz rejects both epistemic deism and traditional intervention-
ism and defends that there is a third option to respond to the Argument against 
Miracles and open the possibility of divine interventions. This third option he 
calls “Strong/open probabilistic theism” and he explains his reasons for endorsing 
precisely that model.4
In order to understand how “strong/open probabilistic theism” solves the Argu-
ment against Miracles, it will be helpful to formulate the argument itself as follows: 
(3)  The laws of nature are complete and deterministic, i.e., they predict only one pos-
sible outcome for a given (complete) description of the past. (premise)
(4)  Therefore, if God were to act or intervene in the world (to influence which course 
of history happens), He would have to make happen a course of history contrary 
to the (unique) prediction of the laws of Nature. (from 3)
(5)  Actualizing a course of history that is contrary to the prediction of the laws of 
Nature is breaking the laws. (premise)
(6)  It is impossible that God should break the laws. (premise)
(7)  Therefore, it is impossible for God to act or intervene in the world (from 4, 5 and 6).
This argument has three main premises: the premise of causal determinism 
(3), a premise defining what it is to “break a law” (5), and a premise that forbids 
breaking the laws (6). There are therefore three ways to undermine the argument. 
Epistemic deism is based on the rejection of premise (3): the laws of nature are 
not deterministic and complete, and therefore it is possible for God to influence the 
course of history while remaining within the boundaries of what the laws of nature 
4 In section 4 of the paper, a fourth model of providence is examined: namely “weak/closed 
probabilistic theism.” I do not mention it in the present context because it is not a solution to the 
problem of miracles. Indeed, the main objection that Łukasiewicz opposes to this model of providence 
is precisely that it cannot account for miracles with its proper resources. To account for miracles, it 
would have to “be reduced to epistemic deism or even to traditional interventionism” (sec. 4.2.1). 
The reason why Łukasiewicz studies this model, I believe, is that Łukasiewicz’s project is not just 
to respond to the specific Argument against Miracles, but more generally to compare all models of 
providence and choose the best one. It seems legitimate, therefore, to have it in the list of possible 
models. But in the specific dialectical situation of the possible responses to the Argument against 
Miracles, “weak/closed probabilistic theism” is a non-starter.
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make possible. Traditional interventionism rejects premise (6): it is possible for 
God to break the laws of nature (because He is Himself the author of these laws).
Łukasiewicz’s response to the argument relies on the rejection of premise (5): 
in his view, it is possible for God to actualize a course of history contrary to what 
the laws of nature predict without thereby breaking the laws of nature. How is 
this possible? The response hinges on a careful analysis of the nature of the laws 
of nature which, as Plantinga notes, always contain the condition or proviso that 
the system they describe is a causally closed system:
If we think of the laws of nature as describing how the universe works when the uni-
verse is causally closed (when God is not acting specially in the world), they would 
be of the following form:
(LN) When the universe is causally closed (when God is not acting specially in the 
world), P. (Plantinga 2012, 80)
And Łukasiewicz shows that this allows for a new understanding of divine in-
tervention:
… if we assume that the world is a causally open system, and a law of nature is a law 
which “works” or is applied in causally closed (or: isolated) systems only, then we 
are allowed to claim that God can act at every level of the world in whatever way He 
chooses to act, for this or that reason, without breaking any laws of nature. (sec. 4.2.2.)
It should be noted that Łukasiewicz also rejects that the laws of nature are complete 
and deterministic (premise 3), because he is fully aware of the indeterminacies of 
QM. But what is important in our context is that he does not base his response to 
the Argument against Miracles on the rejection of premise 3—a response based 
on the rejection of premise 3 would have to say that God can act and intervene 
only at the level of QM indeterminacies, and this limitation is precisely what 
Łukasiewicz rejects. In other words, even if Łukasiewicz accepts QM indeter-
minacies, his response to the Argument against Miracles is one that would work 
just as well in a completely deterministic world. His solution makes no use of the 
probabilistic nature of QM laws. In other words, Łukasiewicz’s reasons to adopt 
a properly probabilistic model of providence have nothing to do with the dialectics 
of the Argument against Miracles.
Now, if we restrict ourselves to this precise debate, what are Łukasiewicz’s rea-
sons to reject both epistemic deism and traditional interventionism, and to endorse 
the solution based on the causal openness of the world? Łukasiewicz has mainly 
two objections against epistemic deism and one against traditional interventionism.
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The first (general) objection against epistemic deism is that allowing God to 
intervene only where there is an indeterministic leeway would be an unacceptable 
limitation of God’s omnipotence. The second is that some biblical miracles (in 
particular the future realisation of the New Earth and the New Heaven) cannot be 
performed just by nudging particles at the level of QM indeterminacies.
I am not sure whether I agree or not with the decisiveness of these objections. 
For one thing, not all limitations of God’s action are limitations of his power—for 
example, God cannot lie, not as a limitation of his power, but as a limitation of his 
will (which is morally perfect)—and one might argue that God has the power to 
break the laws of nature but could not possibly want to break them, because there 
would be a practical incoherence in willing to promulgate a law and willing to 
break it at the same time. Since God’s will cannot contain practical incoherences, 
therefore, breaking the laws is ruled out as impossible by the perfection of his will 
(not by the limitation of his power). This is (a version of) what Plantinga calls 
“the divine consistency objection” (Plantinga 2012, 104–8). I am not personally 
sympathetic to this objection, but it seems worthy of discussion.
As for the second objection, I am not sure why a profound manipulation of 
quantum indeterminacies could not generate such a drastic modification of the face 
of the universe that it would be legitimate to talk of “a New Earth and a New 
Heaven.” Łukasiewicz indicates very briefly that this seems impossible because 
“according to the widely accepted model of cosmology, the universe will be either 
too big or too small, and therefore, transformation of the nature will not be pos-
sible,” and I assume that he develops this point in more details in works that I have 
not been able to read, but I suppose that I would need to read these developments 
to really understand the basis of these impossibilities.
Be that as it may, the point I want to press is not Łukasiewicz’s rejection of 
epistemic deism, but rather his rejection of traditional interventionism. As far as 
I can tell, the only argument in Łukasiewicz’s paper that would justify a rejection 
of traditional interventionism is the following:
The assumption that God should not break the laws of nature which He created for 
the world is based on the idea of divine perfection: a perfect being does not change 
the rules that it issued. (sec. 4.1)
Why should we accept that “a perfect being does not change the rules that it is-
sued”? Imagine an excellent professor who wants his pupil to make progress: he 
first gives her some simple exercises, with simple rules, and when he sees that 
she has made some progress, he changes the rules slightly to make the exercise 
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more difficult. Is that not a sign of the professor’s intelligence and perfection that 
he is able to follow the progress of his pupil by changing the rules?
I think the intuitive pull of this objection is better formulated as follows: “a per-
fect being does not change its intentions (it does not intend something and then, 
later on, repent having intended it and change its intentions).” Applied to God, 
this has to do with the traditional notion of divine immutability. Let us accept that 
a perfect God cannot change his intentions,5 does that necessarily mean that he 
cannot change (or suspend) the rules or the laws that he promulgates? After all, 
the professor in our little scenario did not change his intentions either: from the 
very beginning, he had the intention to change the rules in accordance with the 
progress of his pupil. So, when traditional interventionism says that God makes 
an exception to, or suspends, a law of nature (by performing a miracle), does it 
imply that God has changed his mind, that he has changed his intentions? The 
answer, it seems to me, is clearly no: when God promulgates the laws of nature, 
for example a law L of the following form:
L: Every time circumstances c1, c2, etc. occur, event E will occur.
God knows from the start that He might want later on to suspend this law. He 
has this intention from the very beginning. So when He encounters a situation 
that justifies a miraculous intervention, His breaking the law L does not amount 
to changing His intention. In other words, in traditional interventionism, a law of 
the form L is always promulgated by an intention of the following form:
I: The world will follow the law L, except in situations in which I [God] will intervene.
And this intention is not revised or changed when God happens to intervene by 
a miracle—God’s intentions remain immutable. Therefore, traditional interven-
tionism does not raise a problem against divine immutability or the perfection of 
His intentions.
My first remark, then, is that I am not convinced by the argument against 
traditional interventionism. If that is so, then Łukasiewicz seems to lack a reason 
to prefer open interventionism (or open probabilistic theism) over traditional in-
terventionism.
5 An issue that could be raised here is the famous problem of the Biblical texts that seem to 
picture God as “repenting” or regretting his previous actions. On this problem, see (Peels 2016). I will 
not open this discussion here because I am not convinced that these texts need to be interpreted as 
implying a change of intention in God.
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But I want to make a further remark: in my view, the problem is not so much 
that traditional interventionism is no more problematic than open intervention-
ism. The problem is that it is hardly distinguishable from it. I, at least, cannot 
see a substantial difference between the two views. Here is why. Łukasiewicz’s 
open interventionism argues that God does not break the laws, because the laws 
of nature all contain a condition or proviso stating that they apply only in a closed 
system, i.e., (in our context) when God does not intervene. In other words, the 
laws of nature have the following form:
L*: Every time circumstances c1, c2, etc. occur, event E will occur, except in situations 
in which God will intervene.
And presumably, God promulgates these laws by forming intentions of the fol-
lowing form:
I*: The world will follow the law L*.
Given the proviso or condition stated in L*, when God miraculously intervenes 
in the world, the law is not suspended or broken—it only becomes vacuously true 
(by the satisfaction of the exceptionality condition).
But now, we have two different ways in which God can promulgate laws, and 
correspondingly two different kinds of laws:
Traditional interventionism:
I: The world will follow the law L, except in situations in which I [God] will intervene.
L: Every time circumstances c1, c2, etc. occur, event E will occur.
Open interventionism:
I*: The world will follow the law L*.
L*: Every time circumstances c1, c2, etc. occur, event E will occur, except in situations 
in which God will intervene.
In both cases, there is an exceptionality proviso, a condition under which the 
predictions of the law will not be satisfied, which allow for the possibility of 
miracles. The only difference is that in open interventionism the proviso appears 
in the law itself (so that the law is not “broken” or “suspended” in the miraculous 
exception), while in traditional interventionism it appears in God’s promulgating 
intention but not in the law itself (so that the law is “broken” or “suspended” in the 
miraculous exception). But I have the greatest difficulties in seeing this difference 
as being a substantial one: as far as I can tell, the couple I/L is just another way 
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to describe the same divine action as I*/L*, so that the debate between traditional 
interventionism and open interventionism seems to me to be merely verbal.
If it is not verbal, that is, if there really is an ontological difference between 
promulgating a law which contains a proviso and promulgating a law with an 
intention that contains the very same proviso, then at least this ontological differ-
ence seems to be totally irrelevant to God’s perfection.
My second question to Łukasiewicz, therefore, would be the following: Why 
does he not simply endorse traditional interventionism as a response to the prob-
lem of Miracles? Does the idea of openness of the laws really make any relevant 
difference?
I understand that, for other reasons (which we will discuss in the next part), 
Łukasiewicz wants to maintain that there are some “free gaps” of chance or inde-
terminism in the world (as part of God’s plan), but that is completely compatible 
with traditional interventionism: it might well be that God’s plan contains both 
traditional law-breaking interventions (situated at any level of the world) and (for 
other purposes) some free gaps of indeterminism. So the existence of chance or 
indeterminism cannot be a reason to reject traditional interventionism either.
III. DOES CHANCE DISPROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A PROVIDENT GOD? 
THE ARGUMENT FROM CHANCE
In the first two sections, we have studied two lines of arguments according to 
which the existence of Chance in the world could have a positive impact on the 
possibility of a traditional conception of God (understood as the Fine-Tuner of the 
Universe, and as an Intervener or author of miracles). These lines of arguments 
are important for the general project of drawing all the conclusions we can from 
the (scientific) data of Chance to the concept of God.
But the line of argument that takes centre stage in Łukasiewicz’s reflection is 
the Argument from Chance, i.e., the possibility of a negative impact of the data of 
Chance, the possibility that Chance might disprove the existence of a (provident) 
God.
As I said in the introduction, Łukasiewicz argues that the Argument from 
Chance does not disprove the existence of Providence in general, but that it does 
disprove one picture of Providence, namely the picture of divine Providence as 
being “detailed” or “fine-grained,” in other words, as encompassing and control-
ling every single detail of the creation. And somewhat paradoxically, Łukasiewicz 
welcomes this conclusion, because (according to him), it provides a new argument 
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for a coarse coarse-grained model of Providence, i.e., the model he favours for 
independent theological and a priori reasons.
It should be made clear that in this dialectical set up Łukasiewicz has in fact 
two different purposes and two different interlocutors. On the one hand, he is dis-
cussing with the defender of the Argument from Chance, and trying to prove him 
that this argument does not disprove the existence of a (provident) God. But at 
the same time, Łukasiewicz is also discussing with the defender of the traditional 
(fine-grained) conception of Providence, and using the tools of the Argument from 
Chance to prove her that her conception of Providence is untenable.
And in fact, in the present historical context, it seems to me that the most 
important of these two discussions is the latter, not the former. Why? Because, 
as Łukasiewicz himself remarks, “the argument from chance has never been very 
popular or frequently discussed” (Łukasiewicz 2015, 200). When contemporary 
philosophers (or scientists) consider the fact that QM posits indeterminacies in the 
fabric of Nature, very few (in fact no one that I am aware of) have the reaction 
to draw the conclusion: “well, therefore that proves that God does not exist!” In 
other words, the “defender” of the (atheist) Argument from Chance, in its pure 
and general form, is more a philosophical fiction (useful for dialectical purposes 
like other similar fictitious interlocutors) than a flesh-and-bone interlocutor in the 
contemporary debate.
In contrast, the defender of a traditional (fine-grained) conception of Providence 
is a very real interlocutor, and the refinement of Łukasiewicz’s discussion against her 
proves that he is fully aware of the importance of arguing against this interlocutor.
In this section, my main claim will be that Łukasiewicz probably succeeds 
in refuting an extreme version of the fine-grained conception of Providence, but 
that he might be neglecting another version, which seems fine-grained enough 
for the purposes of traditional providentialism (certainly more fine-grained than 
Łukasiewicz’s coarse-grained model). I will suggest that this fine-grained enough 
model is not refuted by Łukasiewicz’s arguments, and that it remains more plau-
sible than the coarse-grained model he defends.
I will proceed in four steps. First, I will set aside the question of biological 
(or evolutionary) chance, to concentrate just on QM chance (i.e., indeterminism). 
Second, I will concede that physical indeterminism probably disproves the ex-
treme fine-grained model of Providence. But, third, I will argue that this does not 
suffice to support Łukasiewicz’s coarse-grained model, because there is another 
model, fine-grained enough, that is also compatible with the scientific data of QM 
indeterminism. So we do not have scientific reasons to prefer the coarse-grained 
model over the fine-grained enough model. And finally, I will argue that we also 
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do not have (convincing) philosophical or theological reasons to prefer the coarse-
grained model. On the contrary, it seems to me that these considerations should 
favour the fine-grained enough model.
IIIa. What is the source of “chance” that is relevant  
for the Argument from Chance? Evolutionary biology  
and QM indeterminism
In his paper “Argument from Chance” (2015), Łukasiewicz mentions three data 
of chance that could play a role in the first premise of the Argument from Chance: 
“On the quantum level, there is a radioactive decay of atoms, on the molecular 
level genetic mutations happen, and on the level of human history there are human 
free choices and free actions.” (2015, 205)
Now, even though the discussion of (libertarian) free will is clearly relevant if 
one is to provide a complete model of divine providence and chance, it can hardly 
be argued that it is a scientific datum. If it is a datum at all, it is rather a datum of 
consciousness, or introspection, or common sense, or something of the kind. But 
not a datum of science. Indeed, in the paper published in this issue, even though 
Łukasiewicz (legitimately) maintains a discussion of Free Will, he does not present 
it as a datum that fuels the first premise of the Argument from Chance.
The two scientific data that are discussed in this new paper are only the data 
of evolutionary biology and the data of QM indeterminism. There is probably 
a simple historical reason why Łukasiewicz discusses so much the data of evo-
lutionary biology in connexion with the Argument from Chance. Historically, the 
main advocates of what looks like a version of the Argument from Chance—first 
and foremost Jacques Monod in Le hasard et la nécessité (Monod 1970)—based 
their argument entirely on the biological notion of chance (namely the idea of 
“random mutations” at the core of natural evolution). This biological problem of 
chance is at the core of Bartholomew’s discussion in both his books (1984; 2008), 
which start with a discussion of Monod’s argument. We said earlier that there is 
no real life defender of the atheist Argument from Quantum Chance, but there 
has been real life defenders of the atheist Argument from Evolutionary Chance.
This might justify us to concentrate on the latter rather than the former. In fact, 
I think we should do the opposite, for the following reason: while the Argument 
from Quantum Chance does establish some conclusion (a very modest conclu-
sion—that’s why it is not very much discussed), the Argument from Evolutionary 
Chance is, I believe, a complete failure: it does not establish anything, not even 
a modest conclusion.
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To understand my point here, it is important to distinguish the Argument from 
Evolutionary Chance from another argument from Evolution which I will call the 
Evolutionary Objection against Biological Design. This latter argument is not an 
argument that tries to prove the non-existence of God; rather, it is an objection 
against a proof of God’s existence—namely the Biological Design Argument that 
we can find, prominently, in the works of William Paley (or more recently in the 
Intelligent Design movement). According to Paley, the biological realm shows 
evidence of Design that cries out for an explanation, and the best explanation is 
that there is an intelligent Designer of Nature, a God. In response to this argument, 
the Evolutionary Objection against Biological Design says that we have a better 
explanation of the data (namely evolution of species via natural selection) and 
that therefore Paley’s argument fails to prove the existence of God. As far as I am 
concerned, I take this Evolutionary Objection to be perfectly legitimate and suc-
cessful: it does establish that we cannot prove the existence of God via Biological 
Design … but it does not establish that God does not exist and we might very 
well have other justifications to believe that He exists (perhaps reasons having to 
do with cosmic Fine-Tuning, for instance).
The Argument from Evolutionary Chance is completely different in purpose. 
It does not simply undermine one argument for God’s existence: it pretends to 
positively prove God’s non-existence. And the underlying thought here is not just 
the process of evolution of species via natural selection, but rather the idea that 
this process relies on “chance”—because (according to the Darwinian theory) the 
genetic mutations that drive the process of evolution are “random.” Since chance 
and randomness are incompatible with a providential divine control of the emer-
gence of human beings, the argument concludes that there is no such thing as 
a (voluntary) creator of human beings.
I follow Alvin Plantinga in thinking that this argument relies entirely on a verbal 
confusion about the word “random.” In the context of the theory of evolution, this 
word has a precise scientific meaning that has nothing to do with indeterminism 
or chance. Plantinga quotes two scientific authorities about this point:
If these mutations are random, aren’t they just a matter of chance? But randomness, 
as construed by contemporary biologists, does not have this implication. According to 
Ernst Mayr, the dean of post-WWII biology, “When it is said that mutation or varia-
tion is random, the statement simply means that there is no correlation between the 
production of new genotypes and the adaptational needs of an organism in a given 
environment.” Elliott Sober, one of the most respected contemporary philosophers of 
biology, puts the point a bit more carefully: “There is no physical mechanism (either 
inside organisms or outside of them) that detects which mutations would be beneficial 
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and causes those mutations to occur.” But their being random in that sense is clearly 
compatible with their being caused by God.” (Plantinga 2012, 11–12)
One way for God to cause these mutations would be of course to intervene via 
a miracle; but an appeal to miracles would be probably inefficacious in the pres-
ent discussion with a defender of the atheist argument. What is more relevant is 
that there is another way in which God could control the mutations—a way that 
is completely compatible with naturalism and with the scientific data of random 
mutations. Since “randomness” (in the precise biological sense) is completely 
compatible with causal determinism, God might have set up the initial conditions 
of the universe so that they would eventually lead to precisely these mutations. To 
take a metaphor, God could be like an extraordinary snooker player who predicts 
all the future movements of all the balls, and manages to put all the balls in the 
pockets with just one initial shot. If the snooker player is really extraordinarily 
competent, we would not say that the last ball falling in the pocket is a matter of 
chance: we would say that it was “controlled” by the player, even though it was 
control “at a temporal distance” via calculations and predictions. The reason why 
it is not chance is because it was done completely on purpose, and as the realisa-
tion of a (sophisticated and long-term) plan. The same could be the case for God 
controlling “random” mutations via a series of complex deterministic calculations.
Therefore, the “randomness” of genetic mutations, when we take it in its precise 
scientific meaning (and not is some confused meaning) is obviously compatible 
with divine Providence.
I suspect some defenders of the Argument from Biological Chance would want 
to object here that God could not control genetic mutations in this complex way 
(i.e., by controlling the initial conditions) because there are indeterminacies (due 
to QM) and that the mutations could depend on these QM indeterminacies. But if 
she says this, then she is in fact abandoning the Argument from Biological Chance 
in favour of the Argument from Quantum Chance: for in this new objection, what 
is supposed to impede God’s providential control is not at all the “randomness” of 
genetic mutations (even if they were not “random” in the biological sense, they 
would still be uncontrollable by divine predictions if they depend on QM indeter-
minacies); rather, the only thing that impedes God’s providential control here is 
QM indeterminacies themselves. So this is in fact acknowledging that “biological 
chance” as such is a non-starter for an Argument from Chance, and that the only 
potential problem of Chance relies on indeterminism (as evidenced by QM).
This is why I believe that the whole discussion of the Argument from Chance 
should set aside completely the irrelevant issue of evolutionary randomness and 
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concentrate only on the potential upshot of QM indeterminacies on our conception 
of divine Providence.
IIIb. Do QM indeterminacies disprove the fine-grained model  
of Providence?
God’s Providence in general is the idea that God cares about what happens to 
his creatures; He cares about the events going on in the world and sees to it that 
they follow a certain project He has for it.
But this general idea can be applied in different ways: God’s care for His crea-
tures can be more or less fine-grained. For example, God might care only about 
the ultimate salvation of some human beings, and be prepared to let the world 
follow different routes, as long as they all lead to this ultimate goal. This would 
be a relatively coarse-grained Providence. At one extreme of this spectrum, there 
is the view that God cares about every single event, every detail of the history 
of the world, each movement of each atom or particle. I call this model the “ex-
treme fine-grained model” of Providence. I am not sure what the opposite extreme 
of the spectrum might be: perhaps a picture of Providence in which God only 
cares about the mere existence of the world, but not about any particular course 
of history. Between these two extremes, there are various levels of more or less 
fine-grained models.
What I just called the “extreme fine-grained model of providence” is what 
Łukasiewicz calls the “traditional model of divine providence.” I do not know 
whether it is really “traditional” in any strong sense, in other words, I’m not sure 
that so many ancient authors have really thought about the literal and absolute 
truth of this model—but it is indeed a model that we can find in the works of some 
important philosophers and theologians, and which these authors usually present 
as being supported by Scripture and the Tradition.
We find this picture, for instance, in Peter Geach’s chapter “The Ordainer of 
the Lottery” (Geach 1977, chap. 6), which presents divine Providence as ordering 
all events, however small, even those which seem to be left to chance, like for 
instance the toss-up that led to the choice between St Matthias and St Justus to 
replace Judas. Geach explicitly upholds “the doctrine that all events however trivial 
fall within the ordering of Providence,” or again that “no detail of the universe 
is too petty for the Divine knowledge and will” (Geach 1977, 116). And Geach 
backs up this view with an appeal to Scripture: he considers that this conception 
of Providence “is the real meaning of Christ’s words about the fall of the sparrow” 
(ibid.). Here is the text from the Gospel of Matthew:
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Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground 
without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear ye not 
therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows.” (Matt. 10:29–31)
Łukasiewicz also quotes a similar view in the (more recent) works of Hugh Mc-
Cann, who presents God as “the epitome of the micromanager.” What is interest-
ing is that McCann explicitly states that the traditional Christian conception of 
God forces us to adopt this extreme fine-grained view of Providence: “Only such 
a position is consistent with Western theism’s image of God as an all-loving father, 
who knows the fall of every sparrow, and whose concern for the well-being of his 
creature is complete and pervasive.” (McCann 2012, 29).
In response to Geach and McCann, I want to express, first, my full agreement 
with Łukasiewicz when he says that a picture of the perfection (or fatherly love) 
of God which literally “depends on minute and irrelevant details, for instance on 
the number of protons, neutrinos, or hairs on one’s head, is … unconvincing” (sec. 
5). Imagine a certain proton whose movement, at time t, is undetermined between 
two possibilities due to the application of a non-deterministic quantum law; suppose 
that whether the movement of this proton is m1 or m2, this microscopic differ-
ence at time t will be completely cancelled out at the macroscopic level of human 
beings or even any living being. Why should a providential God care about the 
movement of this proton? Why should He see to it that it be m1 rather than m2? 
Why should it be problematic that this event be left to pure chance? If McCann’s 
motivation is really that God should care about “the well-being of his creature” 
(as he says it is), then I do not see why this difference should matter for God: the 
well-being of all living creatures is not affected (by assumption), and there is no 
such thing as the “well-being” of a proton or a non-living being, is there? If we 
consider the scriptural argument proposed by Geach, I think we will arrive at the 
same result: in the context of Christ’s words about the fall of the sparrow, it is 
clear that what Christ is trying to convey is that we (human beings) should have 
complete confidence in God because God takes care, in the smallest details, of 
what might affect our well-being or happiness. Why should it be comforting or 
a cause of confidence in God to learn that He not only takes care of what affects 
our well-being but also of minute details of the world that do not affect anyone’s 
well-being? Reading these words of Christ as implying that God controls literally 
every single particle of the universe in its slightest movement is clearly herme-
neutically unconvincing. And again I am not so sure that this literal and extreme 
interpretation is really so traditional in the history of Christian theology.
Second, I also agree with Łukasiewicz that the scientific data of chance in Na-
ture (namely QM indeterminism) strongly speak against the extreme fine-grained 
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model of Providence. To be more precise and careful, I would not say that QM 
indeterminacies deductively prove that the extreme fine-grained model is false. The 
reason of my prudence here is that it seems logically and metaphysically possible 
for God to intervene miraculously in each and every place of the world where 
there is a QM indeterminacy, so that nothing at all would be left to chance. The 
intervention at play here would be of the king that we have seen under the label 
of “epistemic deism” above. Notice that epistemic deism in itself is originally 
constructed as a solution to the problem of the possibility of miracles: to solve 
this particular problem, the epistemic deist only takes advantage of some inde-
terminacies in order for God to perform miracles in them, but the epistemic deist 
(originally) has no reason to postulate that God intervenes in all indeterminacies. 
The view we are now considering—we could call it “radical epistemic deism”—
takes this more radical step because it is used as a solution to a different problem, 
namely the Argument from Chance: radical epistemic deism tries to eliminate any 
trace of chance in the world, and therefore requires God to perform a (non-law-
breaking) miracle every time there is an indeterminacy in the world. So it seems 
metaphysically possible to have both QM indeterminism and extreme fine-grained 
Providence… but the picture of this metaphysical possibility is clearly unbeliev-
able. It is the picture of a God who performs billions of miracles every second all 
over the world just in order to make sure that completely irrelevant phenomena 
are not left to chance. Apart from the fact that this God seems more like a person 
suffering from OCD than like an epitome of wisdom, it should be emphasized that 
this scenario is a kind of sceptical scenario of quasi-universal deception. That God 
may sometimes, occasionally, perform miracles at some QM indeterminacies, that 
would be a mild deception of our expectancies, justified by whatever exception 
renders this particular miracle important. But that God should systematically sup-
press all indeterminacies that seem to be there, this would be a sceptical scenario 
of radical deception, and this raises of course very serious epistemological issues 
for the rest of our belief system.
For these reasons, I agree with Łukasiewicz that, if we want to take seriously 
the scientific datum of QM indeterminism (and we should take it seriously), we 
cannot maintain the extreme fine-grained model of Providence. It seems extremely 
probable that God, the loving and provident God, will leave to pure chance at 
least some inconsequential movements of fundamental particles (unless He suffers 
from some problematic form of OCD or perfectionism).
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IIIc. Do QM indeterminacies prove the coarse-grained model  
of Providence?
Where does this leave us exactly? We have seen that there was a whole range 
of more or less fine-grained models of Providence, from the extreme fine-grained 
model (or the “traditional model” in Łukasiewicz’s terminology) to the extreme 
coarse-grained model (perhaps one in which God only cares about the mere exis-
tence of his creation, but not at all about what happens to it). And I have expressed 
my agreement with Łukasiewicz that the extreme fine-grained model is disproved 
by the scientific data of chance (at least in the sense that it is rendered epistemi-
cally wildly improbable, if not in the sense of being deductively disproved). This 
leaves us then with all the rest of the range of possibilities.
Among these other possibilities, I would like to single out two intermediate 
positions, which I will call the “fine-grained enough model” or “FAPP-fine-grained 
model” (FAPP standing for “for all practical purposes”) on the one hand, and the 
“Łukasiewicz coarse-grained model.”
The FAPP-fine-grained model is motivated by our previous discussion of God’s 
fatherly love for His creatures, and His caring for their well-being. We said earlier 
that such a God, even if He cared about the most minute details of His creatures’ 
well-being would not have any reason to care for all quantum states of all particles, 
because some of them do not have any effect on any creature’s well-being. This 
naturally suggests the picture of a God who would control or care about absolutely 
all details of the world that have any effect on some creature’s well-being. If 
some QM indeterminacy has no effect whatsoever at the macro-level of creaturely 
well-being, then this God will leave it to chance; on the other hand, if it has an 
effect (even the slightest effect) on some creature’s (any creature’s) well-being, 
then God will look carefully about the possibility to intervene or not (and if He 
does not intervene, it will have to be because He has some specific reason not to 
intervene there). This model of Providence is not the extreme fine-grained model of 
Providence. It takes into account that God will leave some events to pure chance. 
But it seems to be fine-grained enough to satisfy McCann’s motivation of the 
perfect and “all-loving father,” and also fine-grained enough to justify a complete 
confidence in God (because literally everything we could possibly care about, He 
also cared about it before us). It is fine-grained “for all practical purposes” (for all 
purposes having to do with any creature’s well-being). I am tempted to think that 
this model could legitimately be called “traditional”—or perhaps more carefully, 
I am tempted to think that the tradition does not clearly distinguish between the 
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extreme and the FAPP fine-grained models, so that the FAPP fine-grained is at 
least consistent with the traditional picture of Providence.
It is important to emphasize that Łukasiewicz’s model of Providence is not the 
FAPP-fine-grained model. Łukasiewicz’s model is decidedly more coarse-grained 
than that. The most striking point of disagreement is the following: according to 
Łukasiewicz, the proper idea of God’s perfection (the idea on which we should 
base our conception of Providence) “does not require an explanation of possible 
divine reasons for allowing the instances of horrendous evil to happen” (sect. 5). 
As a consequence, in Łukasiewicz’s model of Providence, it is possible for God 
to leave to pure chance some events that may result in some evil for some crea-
ture—even some horrendous evil. (As we will see later, Peter van Inwagen [2006] 
also defends this view.) That does not mean of course that God leaves everything 
to chance: for instance, Łukasiewicz makes it clear that, in his picture, God will 
ensure the realisation of some coarse-grained projects, like the promise of the New 
Earth and the New Heaven. He will not leave that to pure chance. But at least 
some (horrendous) evils for some creatures He can leave to pure chance. This is 
clearly and importantly more coarse-grained than the FAPP-fine-grained model.
If I do not misinterpret Łukasiewicz’s paper, I believe his intention is to say 
something like this: “The scientific datum of chance (QM indeterminism) dis-
proves the traditional, fine-grained model of Providence, but it does not disprove 
my coarse-grained model, therefore, you should adopt my coarse-grained model.” 
The problem with this reasoning is that it relies on a false dichotomy: the extreme 
fine-grained model and the Łukasiewicz coarse-grained model are not the only two 
possible models of Providence—there is a whole range of intermediate models, 
and in particular the FAPP-fine-grained model. Of course, if these other models 
were disproved by the scientific data (just like the extreme fine-grained model is 
disproved), this might eventually lead us to endorse the Łukasiewicz coarse-grained 
model (or perhaps: any model at least as coarse-grained as his). So we will have 
to examine the question whether the FAPP-fine-grained model is disproved by the 
scientific data. As I will briefly show below, it is not. Therefore the mere fact that 
QM indeterminacies disprove the extreme fine-grained model does not prove the 
Łukasiewicz coarse-grained model, nor does it provide us any reason to prefer 
the coarse-grained model over the FAPP-fine-grained model.
I have the impression that the same false dichotomy is present in his discus-
sion of Thomas Flint’s argument for strong providential control. Łukasiewicz says 
the following:
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Thomas Flint argues that a God without strong providential control may seem a rather 
comical figure (1998, 13). However, I would respond to this that the idea of God whose 
“providential success” depends on minute and irrelevant details, for instance on the 
number of protons, neutrinos, or hairs on one’s head, is far more unconvincing. God 
cannot be viewed as the true Lord of absolutely everything in the universe if His 
“strong” providence is hostage to such irrelevant, minute details. (sec. 5)
To put things in a somewhat strident formulation, it seems that Łukasiewicz is 
arguing as follows: “If you do not want the OCD God who needs to frantically 
control every single neutrino, you have to accept my picture of a God who leaves 
horrendous evils to pure chance.” But (fortunately) this is clearly a false dichotomy: 
there is some room for intermediate models, and I, for one, would favour the 
FAPP-fine-grained model.
Of course, in order to say that the scientific data of chance do not commit us 
directly to the coarse-grained model, we need to show to that these data are also 
consistent with the intermediate model (the FAPP-fine-grained model). But that 
is easy.
What QM physics tells us is that there are microscopic QM indeterminacies. 
But most of these QM indeterminacies are cancelled out at the macro-level (the 
level of living beings) by the laws of statistical physics. Therefore, if we follow 
the FAPP-fine-grained model, all these indeterminacies that cancel out at the 
macro-level will be left to pure chance by God (because He only cares about 
what affects the well-being of His creatures). In other words, in the vast majority 
of cases, where there seems to be pure chance, there is indeed pure chance and 
God is not systematically deceiving us about the fundamental functioning of QM 
indeterminacies. It is true that some QM indeterminacies can be amplified into 
indeterminacies at the macro-level—such a thing happens for example with Geiger 
counters: what an observer reads on a Geiger counter may depend on some QM 
indeterminacies. Notice though that in most cases, what the observer reads on 
a Geiger counter will have no effect whatsoever on his (or anyone’s) well-being 
(though it will have a detectable effect on his sensation and thought). Therefore, 
even in most of these cases, God will have no reason to intervene here and will 
leave it to pure chance. What if the academic life of a scientist, or an important 
publication, depends on his reading this or that on his Geiger counter? Well, in 
that very specific case God may intervene because it will affect the well-being 
of some creature. So the chancy nature of this event will be merely apparent and 
deceptive—in fact, the event will be controlled by a miracle. But as long as these 
cases are exceptional (and the contrived example I have had to imagine suggests 
that they will be exceptional), they raise no more problem (epistemological or 
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metaphysical) than all other miraculous interventions, and Łukasiewicz’s model 
also contains miraculous interventions (at least to realise the promise of the New 
Earth and the New Heaven).
Therefore, from the point of view of the scientific data of chance (QM indeter-
minism), there is absolutely no difference between the FAPP-fine-grained model 
and the Łukasiewicz coarse-grained model. The data of science lead us to reject 
the extreme fine-grained model, but they do not suffice to establish the truth of 
the Łukasiewicz coarse-grained model—they do not provide any reason to prefer 
it over the FAPP-fine-grained model.
There might be reasons to prefer the former over the latter, but these reasons 
(if they exist) are not scientific. They will have to be philosophical or theological.
IIId. Do we have theological or philosophical reasons to embrace 
the coarse-grained model of Providence?
Do we have any theological or philosophical reason to prefer the Łukasiewicz 
coarse-grained model over the FAPP-fine-grained model?
Let us start with the theological or scriptural considerations. Łukasiewicz quotes 
the Book of Revelation, where it is promised that there will be a New Earth and 
a New Heaven and that God “will wipe every tear from their eyes, and there shall 
be no more death or mourning, wailing or pain.” This certainly shows (positively) 
that God cares about some coarse-grained features of history (the eschatological 
features) but it does not suggest (negatively) that God does not care about the 
present “death, mourning, wailing or pain” or that He leaves them to chance. For 
all we know, maybe He controls each one of these sufferings and permits each one 
of them only when it is strictly necessary to reach the big eschatological goals. 
That would be the contrary of leaving them to chance.
What scriptural argument can we make, then, for or against the idea that God 
leaves (some of) our present sufferings to chance?
Christ’s words about the fall of the sparrow, which we have discussed above, 
seem to go clearly against that view. We said above that they could not plausibly 
be interpreted in the extreme sense that God cares about every single atom of the 
universe (even those that affect no one’s well-being); but clearly, Christ’s words, 
if they are to provide comfort and confidence in God’s fatherly care, should entail 
that He cares about our sorrows and in particular about the horrendous evils that 
we face. How unconvincing it would be if Christ said something like this: “Fear 
ye not therefore: God does not care about the horrendous evils that you may en-
counter and leaves them to pure chance!”
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Can we find other biblical evidence that might counterbalance the text of the fall 
of the sparrow? Peter van Inwagen (1988, 64–65) quotes the book of Ecclesiastes 
in support of the coarse-grained model:
I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to 
the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor 
yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all. For man also 
knoweth not his time: as the fishes that are taken in an evil net, and as the birds that 
are caught in the snare; so are the sons of men snared in an evil time, when it falleth 
suddenly upon them. (Eccl. 9:11–12)
The Hebrew word that is translated as “chance” in the King James Version is ֶפַגע 
and comes from the root that means “to happen,” “to occur.” It literally means 
“a happening” or “an occurrence.” In Greek, it was translated as απαντηµα, which 
also comes from the verb “to happen” or “to occur,” and does not necessarily 
convey the idea of “chance” (τυχη). What the Ecclesiastes observes here is that, 
in our present condition, things happy or unhappy happen indifferently to the 
just or the unjust: in other words, what happens to the just and the unjust is not 
calculated according to a logic of immediate retribution. But that does not mean 
that it is not calculated at all, and that it does not come at all from God’s deci-
sion and control. Indeed, in the Gospel, Christ makes the same remark about the 
absence of a logic of immediate retribution but underlies at the same time that 
these events come from God:
But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them 
that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; that 
ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for He maketh his sun 
to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust. 
(Mt 5:44–45; emphasis mine)
God does not send good things to the just and bad things to the unjust; that is not 
His way of proceeding in our present condition. But that does not mean He is not 
in control: it is He who maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good. In 
light of this text, I do not think we can interpret the excerpt from the Ecclesiastes 
as raising doubts about or qualifying the fine-grained model that Christ seems to 
clearly express in his words about the fall of the sparrow.
Overall, it seems to me that Biblical evidence strongly favours the FAPP-fine-
grained model over Łukasiewicz’s (or van Inwagen’s) coarse-grained model.
Let us see whether philosophical arguments can tilt the balance in the op-
posite direction. In section 5 of the paper published in this issue, Łukasiewicz 
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proposes three arguments in favour of the coarse-grained model. I believe his 
paper (Łukasiewicz 2017) offers a fourth one.
First, there is the argument of anthropomorphism. Here is Łukasiewicz’s for-
mulation: 
The belief that lack of God’s total control over every detail and every single particle in 
the world may limit His sovereignty and freedom is an expression of anthropomorphism 
of God’s omnipotence, and it is simply mistaken.
This argument may be right, but it is irrelevant to the present discussion, because 
it is only an argument against the extreme fine-grained model, which requires 
a total control over every single particle. The FAPP-fine-grained model does not 
have this requirement, and the motivation for this model is not some form of 
anthropomorphism (the human idea of a “micromanager”) but rather the need 
to account for God’s fatherly love and care for His creatures’ well-being.6 If the 
extreme fine-grained model were the only alternative to the coarse-grained model, 
then this argument would indeed speak in favour of the latter; but as we have seen 
above, this is a false dichotomy. 
Second, there is the argument from diversity. Łukasiewicz writes:
… lack of chance events in the world would diminish the degree of diversity in the 
world. God’s generosity consists, among others, in the fact that God created the world, 
and it is a world with a multitude of types and tokens of various creatures, where 
diverse oppositions obtain, for example, chance vs. necessity, beauty vs. ugliness, or 
belief vs. disbelief in God.
I am not quite sure about how we should evaluate this second argument. For one 
thing, it seems obvious that most kinds of “diversity” can be realized in a com-
pletely deterministic universe: there is clearly no problem for God to create both 
“beauty and ugliness,” both “belief and disbelief in God,” and all other kinds of 
biological, cosmological, psychological diversities in a completely deterministic 
universe—a world in which God does not leave anything to chance. Of course, 
there is one kind of diversity you would not have in such a universe, namely 
the diversity “chance vs. necessity”. Fair enough. It is not clear to me why we 
should think that God cares about this very specific kind of diversity in itself 
6 Some philosophers may want to object that the idea of fatherly love (applied to God) is also 
a form anthropomorphism. But that is not an objection that Łukasiewicz himself would make, since 
(as we will see in the third point) he explicitly uses this very same idea of fatherly love to make an 
argument in favour of his own coarse-grained model.
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(i.e. independently of whether it renders possible other forms of diversity). But 
let’s suppose He does. Still, it is important to notice that even this very specific 
kind of diversity (chance vs. necessity) is present in the FAPP-fine-grained model, 
because in this model there are purely indeterministic and purely chancy events 
at the quantum level. So it seems to me that this second argument, like the first 
one (anthropomorphism) is in fact directed against the extreme fine-grained model, 
but not against the FAPP-fine-grained. So far, we still do not have any philosophi-
cal reason to prefer the coarse-grained model over the FAPP-fine-grained model.
The third and fourth argument are much more important and difficult, and it 
will not be possible for me to give them a response as developed as they would 
require. But let me present them rapidly and make some general remarks.
The third argument is the argument of Free Will. Łukasiewicz writes:
the idea of  God whose goodness is manifested in the total control over every being is 
unconvincing and incompatible with our intuition of goodness; loving parents allow 
their children to make independent and authentic choices, especially if the choices 
concern important issues.
This is a very powerful argument against the FAPP-fine-grained model. At first 
sight, one might think that it is again targeted specifically against the extreme fine-
grained model, because Łukasiewicz talks about “total control over every being” 
and the FAPP-fine-grained model does not defend a total control over every being. 
But in fact the argument of Free Will also threatens the FAPP-fine-grained model 
for the following reason: in this model, God does not control all events of the 
world, but He does control all events that have an effect on someone’s well-being. 
This entails that He also has to control all human actions that have an effect on 
someone’s well-being. And (arguably) if He controls them, then they are not free 
actions. How then could God leave room for free actions if He controls all actions 
that have an effect on someone’s well-being. Well, maybe He could let free some 
actions, namely those that have no effect on anyone’s well-being—for instance, 
maybe He will let me free (libertarianly free) to choose strawberry or lemon ice-
cream because He knows that no one’s well-being (not even mine) will be affected 
by that choice. But this kind of freedom is what philosophers call “insignificant” 
or “trivial” freedom, and all philosophers who defend the importance that God 
preserve human freedom agree in saying that the kind of freedom that is important 
and worth saving is significant freedom, not trivial freedom. If God allows me to 
be really free about some significant action – some action that will have an effect 
on someone’s well-being (perhaps my own)—then it seems that God allows for 
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the possibility that I will use this significant freedom in the bad way, and God 
is not controlling the evil (for others or for myself) that would come out of my 
choice. Therefore, it seems that if God wants to preserve significant (libertarian) 
freedom for his creatures, then He cannot exert a fine-grained Providence, not 
even FAPP-fine-grained.
The other reason why this argument is important and dialectically strong is 
that it is motivated by the very same divine attribute as the FAPP-fine-grained 
model. The latter, we said, is motivated by the idea of God’s fatherly love (and 
care for the well-being of His creature). But as we can see in Łukasiewicz’s quote 
above, the view that God should preserve our (significant libertarian) freedom is 
also motivated by the idea of God’s fatherly love for us: a loving father would 
not control every single (significant) action of His children.
I will make two brief remarks about this argument.
First, if this problem of Free Will is our (only) reason to limit God’s providential 
control and allow some “chance” events in the world, then it seems that it cannot 
generalize to the acceptance of non-free chancy events. Compare two indeterministic 
situations in the world. S1 is an indeterministic situation in Sophie’s brain, which 
will result either in Sophie’s telling a lie to her friend (causing him some suffering) 
or in Sophie’s telling the truth to her friend (which will enhance his well-being). 
S2 is an other indeterministic quantum situation that will have macroscopic ef-
fects on the Geiger counter of Bob, a scientist preparing an important paper in 
quantum physics: this situation will result either in Bob’s making an observation 
that confirms his hypotheses (which will enhance his professional well-being) or 
in Bob’s making an observation that disconfirms his hypotheses (causing him some 
distress). If our only motivation to limit God’s providential control is the free will 
of human agents, then God should leave situation S1 to “chance” (or better said: 
“to Sophie’s free choice”), but He should control situation S2 (because in doing 
so He can prevent some distress without thereby diminishing anyone’s Free Will). 
This would suggest a new intermediate model of Providence: one in which God 
suppresses all chance from the world, with only two exceptions: (i) microphysical 
indeterminacies that have no effect whatsoever on anyone’s well-being, and (ii) 
indeterminacies that correspond to some agent’s (significant) free choice. Apart 
from these two exceptions, the new model (let us call it the “Freedom-exception 
model” of Providence) gives God maximal control over the world, and in par-
ticular total control over purely physical indeterminacies that have effects on the 
creatures’ well-being. That is not van Inwagen’s model, and I believe that is not 
Łukasiewicz’s model either. Van Inwagen and Łukasiewicz seem to say that some 
evils that we suffer are due to pure chance and not just the kind of chance that 
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comes from the free choice of some human agent. So, once again, I think this 
argument is not enough to motivate the full degree of coarse-grainedness that 
van Inwagen and Łukasiewicz want. (To motivate this full degree, the fourth and 
last argument—the argument from the problem of evil—is the one that is really 
important, as we will see.)
Second remark: there is a risk that the freedom-exception model, even if it is 
not as coarse-grained as the Łukasiewicz coarse-grained model, is still too coarse-
grained to provide a satisfactory notion of Providence. This problem is of course 
(one version of) the traditional problem of compatibility between Free Will and 
Providence. To this traditional problem, there are four families of response. (i) 
One solution is to say that God’s love does not require that He preserve our Free 
Will at all—therefore God’s Providence is total and maximally fine-grained, and 
our will is not free. This is (one interpretation of) the Calvinist view, defended for 
example by the Calvinist philosopher Derk Pereboom. (ii) The opposite solution 
is to say that God’s love does not require that He control every single event that 
affects our well-being—therefore, God simply abandons any control over these 
evils that result from the free choice of human beings. This is a family of views 
corresponding to contemporary Open Theism. (iii) A third view tries to find rec-
onciliation between Free Will and maximal control: the idea is that Free Will is in 
fact compatible with complete determinism. This could be called the “compatibilist 
solution,” and historically it seems to have been defended by some Thomists, in 
particular by Bañez.7 This solution seems to require a revision of our notion of 
Free Will, if at least the common sense notion of Free Will is understood as being 
a libertarian notion. (iv) Finally, another intermediate solution tries to reconcile 
maximal control with the libertarian notion of Free Will itself—this might seem 
like an impossible task by definition, but the task has been undertaken by the 
Molinist tradition, represented today in particular by Thomas Flint. If we accept 
this characterization of the debate, I think that van Inwagen’s and Łukasiewicz’s 
picture of Providence falls in the family of views related to Open Theism. And 
the main worry with these views is that there is a risk that they become so coarse-
grained that it would not make sense anymore to use the word “Providence”. 
Here is why: it seems that (in Christian theology at least) there is one general 
eschatological purpose that God must ensure (even if He leaves all other details 
to pure chance), and that is the purpose of leading at least some human beings 
to salvation. But if salvation depends (at least in part) on the free acceptance of 
human beings, then God cannot ensure it in the freedom-exception model (or in 
7 Note that these Thomists do not say that Free Will is compatible with determinism by natural 
causes, only that it is compatible with determinism by God’s grace.
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the Open Theist solution): there is always the (metaphysical) possibility that all 
human beings will always freely reject Him. Therefore, it seems that the resulting 
picture of God’s Providence is extremely coarse-grained: it leaves to pure unpre-
dictable chance not only the goings-on and sufferings in this life, but it also has 
to leave to pure unpredictable chance the most important eschatological purpose 
(the ultimate salvation of at least some human beings). If God’s Providence is so 
coarse-grained that it cannot ensure even this general and fundamental purpose, 
then it seems that (from a theological point of view) it is definitely incompatible 
with the Christian hope and that (from a philosophical point of view) it hardly 
makes sense to call it a “Providence” at all.
For all these reasons, I am more inclined to accept one of the two intermediate 
solutions, that try to reconcile fine-grained Providence with Free Will (either the 
libertarian Molinist solution or the compatibilist Bañezian solution). But this is of 
course one of the hardest problems of philosophical theology in history, and much 
more would need to be said for and against the different views. My only question 
to Łukasiewicz would be: How does he think that God can ensure even the most 
general of His eschatological aims (like the salvation of some human beings) if 
He leaves to pure unpredictable chance the free actions of human beings?
Let us come finally to Łukasiewicz’s fourth argument, the only one (in my 
understanding) that can really motivate his (and van Inwagen’s) coarse-grained 
model according to which God leaves open some instances of non-free chance 
(besides the inconsequential quantum indeterminacies). Łukasiewicz’s main ar-
gument is that allowing some evil to come from pure chance allows us to offer 
a better solution to the problem of evil.
It is interesting to compare here with the dialectical situation of van Inwagen’s 
defense of the coarse-grained model. Even if van Inwagen defends roughly the 
same model, and even though he also thinks that this model has (positive) conse-
quences on the treatment of the problem of evil, yet he does not use these positive 
consequences as his reason to endorse the model. Rather, his reason to think that 
some evils are left to chance (not just chance coming from human Free Will but 
pure physical chance) is disappointingly short (and, in my opinion, unconvincing). 
He says the following:
If much of the world is due to chance, and if much of the world is infected with evil, 
then it would be reasonable to suppose, on purely statistical grounds, that at least some 
evil is due to chance. (van Inwagen 1988, 60)
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The argument is unconvincing for the following reason: all that van Inwagen can 
prove on “purely statistical grounds” is that (given the fact that many events depend 
on some indeterminacies) it is probable that at least some evil depends on some 
indeterminacies, and therefore would be due to chance if God did not intervene 
to control these indeterminacies. But van Inwagen does not give us any reason 
to think that God would not intervene in these indeterminacies that result in evil. 
And from the Biblical argument we have seen above, it seems on the contrary very 
probable that God would intervene (or need a specific reason for not intervening) 
in such situations.
For this reason, I think that Łukasiewicz’s dialectical strategy—which grounds 
the endorsement of the coarse-grained model on its capacity to solve the problem of 
evil—is much more promising than van Inwagen’s strategy. Or at least, this is how 
I interpret Łukasiewicz’s dialectical strategy when he says that one strong reason 
to reject McCann’s fine-grained model of Providence is that “it strengthens the 
atheistic argument from evil” (sec. 5 of the present paper) and when he develops 
this point asking the following question: “How could it be that an omnipotent, 
omniscient and morally perfect being created, according to his eternal and detailed 
plan, all sentient beings having allowed them to suffer?” (Łukasiewicz 2017, 10).8
Why could we say that the coarse-grained model helps us in responding to the 
problem of evil? And is it convincing? A first element of response is provided by 
Łukasiewicz when he has God tell us the following (to comfort us against hor-
rendous evils):
Do not worry and trust me; I can really do everything. I can create everything out of 
nothing and I did it and I can purify, remove and transform even the worst evils. True, 
I did not decree them to happen but they happened because I gave all creatures such 
a great freedom and independence that they could perform even the worst evils and 
they did it. But I am the Lord of everything and I will show you that I can redeem 
even the worst evils. All will be well in the end. (Łukasiewicz 2017, 12)
8 The emphasis is in the original. In its context, this challenge against the model of detailed 
Providence (i.e., the fine-grained model) is set in contrast and in response to the challenge against the 
coarse-grained model: “How could it be that an omnipotent and morally perfect being allows sentient 
beings to exist in the world of chance? Only a God who has everything under his divine control is 
morally justified in creating and sustaining the world containing seemingly pointless and horrendous 
evils” (ibid.). Łukasiewicz does not say explicitly that the challenge against the fine-grained model 
is stronger than the one against the coarse-grained model, and he might be interpreted as saying that 
the coarse-grained model (which we have independent reasons to endorse) is no worse off (but no 
better off either) when confronted with the problem of evil. But it is also possible to interpret him 
as saying that the challenge against the fine-grained model is more serious, and this interpretation 
gives an additional positive reason to endorse the Łukasiewicz coarse-grained model (indeed, in my 
opinion it would be the best argument in favour of this view). 
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 The central element of the theodicy here presented is that horrendous evils are 
not decreed by God—God is not the source of these evils; rather, creatures are, 
in their “great freedom and independence.” Now, of course, if we concentrate on 
the freedom of creatures, what we have here is a traditional Free Will theodicy, 
that is, a theodicy in which the central role is played by the unpredictable free ac-
tions of creatures. We do not have, as yet, a theodicy of chance properly speaking 
(i.e., a theodicy which allows some evils to be produced by natural chance rather 
than freedom chance). But it is interesting to examine two characteristics of the 
(traditional) free will theodicy (characteristics by which Free Will makes it easier 
to solve the problem of evil), because these characteristics will also be present in 
a theodicy of (natural) chance.
The first important and helpful characteristic is that if a certain (horrendous) 
evil is the result of some creature’s free action, then God is clearly not the source 
of this evil. Maybe there remains a problem of God’s permitting this action, but 
at least the problem of God being the source is suppressed. Similarly, if a certain 
(horrendous) evil is the result of some natural chance (for instance the unpredict-
able large-scale effect of some QM indeterminacy), then God is not the source 
of this evil: pure chance is. Here again, there may remain a problem of God’s 
permitting the risk of this chancy process to result in a horrendous evil, but at 
least the problem of the source of evil is suppressed.
The second important and helpful characteristic is that God’s reason for preserv-
ing Free Will in His creatures is a general reason: it was better to have a world 
with free creatures rather than a world without free creatures. God need not have 
a token-specific reason, for each action that He lets free, to let it free. Therefore, 
when Elisabeth suffers some horrendous evil as the result of Robert’s action, 
there is no specific reason to answer the question: “Why did God allow Robert 
to be free in this specific action? Why did not God intervene there and then?” 
According to (one version of) the Free Will defence, there is no response to this 
specific question. This suffering, as a specific token, is without any explanation 
or justification. This might seem like a perplexing thought for Elisabeth, but in 
fact some contemporary philosophers have the feeling that it would be even more 
perplexing – in fact shocking – to suggest that this specific horrendous evil was 
a means for some divine purpose. For these philosophers, it is more comforting 
and, as (Łukasiewicz 2017, 15) says, more “adequate [to] our moral sensitivity” 
to view this “suffering as undeserved and pointless.” God had a reason to create 
Free Will in general and to allow the resultant evils, but He did not have a reason 
to let this action free and to permit this evil.
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A theodicy of natural chance can also use this difference between general and 
token-specific reasons, as van Inwagen clearly says:
Do not attempt any solution to this problem that entails that every particular evil has 
a purpose, or that, with respect to every individual misfortune, or every devastating 
earthquake, or every disease, God has some special reason for allowing it. Concentrate 
rather on the problem of what sort of reasons a loving and providential God might have 
for allowing His creatures to live in a world in which many of the evils that happen 
to them happen to them for no reason at all. (van Inwagen 1988, 65)
There is generally no explanation of why this evil happened to that person. What there 
is, is an explanation of why evils happen to people without any reason. (van Inwagen 
2006, 89)
If God’s reasons to allow natural chance in the world are general reasons, then 
we do not need to look for token-specific reasons why God permitted this or that 
evil to happen as a result of pure chance (He did not have any such reason). And 
this might be comforting or “adequate to our moral sensitivity” because it avoids 
portraying God as using our sufferings as means in His plan. 
This strategy could be very interesting in elaborating a full response to the 
problem of evil because it applies some general characteristics that seem to work 
in a Free Will theodicy but it extends these characteristics to situations in which 
the relevant evils do not seem to be a result of anyone’s free action. In other 
words, a theodicy of natural chance might provide a response to the traditional 
“earthquakes” objection to the Free Will theodicy: “You say that God permits evil 
in the world only to preserve the Free Will of His creatures, but what about earth-
quakes and hurricanes: they are sources of evil but no free creature caused them” 
(van Inwagen 2006, 73). A theodicy of natural chance would have a response to 
this “earthquakes” objection which has dialectical advantages structurally parallel 
to those of the free will theodicy.
So far so good. A theodicy of natural chance has some interesting promises… 
but they all rely on one fundamental premise, which is that God had a general 
reason not only to preserve the Free Will of His rational creatures, but also to 
create a world in which there is pure natural chance (which sometimes results 
in horrendous evils). The problem is that we can see easily (or fairly easily) 
what God’s general reason might be to preserve Free Will: Free Will seems to 
be a good in itself, or at least the necessary condition of a certain fullness of life 
for His creatures. But why would it be good to create a world in which there is 
pure natural chance (sometimes leading to horrendous evils)? Is “natural chance” 
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a good in itself? For whom? For protons? Just for the aesthetic property of having 
a contrast class with determinism?
In the papers by Łukasiewicz that I have been able to read, I have not found 
a satisfactory answer to this question. But van Inwagen does propose an answer, 
and I would be curious to know whether Łukasiewicz could accept this proposal 
or would prefer an alternative answer.
Let us recall the question: “What would be a (general) reason for God to allow 
the existence of pure natural chance in the world that (sometimes) results in (hor-
rendous) evils?” Van Inwagen’s response (or proposal) consists in a story of the 
Fall of Human Beings and of God’s “rescue operation.” This story is rather long 
(van Inwagen 2006, 85–89), so I will summarize the central point that responds 
specifically to our question. According to van Inwagen’s story, before the Fall, 
Human Beings were not threatened by evils (horrendous or otherwise) produced by 
pure chance (they had preternatural powers to protect themselves against any such 
threats as earthquakes and hurricanes). Their being threatened by evils happening 
by pure chance was an effect of the Fall (in which they lost their preternatural pow-
ers). That being said, even after the Fall, God could prevent the chancy events to 
result in evils for Human Beings—He could do it by performing as many miracles 
as are required to protect them. So why does He not do this? Why does God let 
these evils happen by pure chance? Van Inwagen’s scenario responds as follows:
As is the case with many rescue operations, the rescuer and those whom he is rescuing 
must cooperate. For human beings to cooperate with God in this rescue operation, they 
must know that they need to be rescued. They must know what it means to be separated 
from him. And what it means to be separated from God is to live in a world of horrors. 
If God simply “canceled” all the horrors of this world by an endless series of miracles, 
he would thereby frustrate his own plan of reconciliation. (van Inwagen 2006, 86)
 To summarize, why then is it good for God to let us live in a world where pure 
natural chance sometimes causes (horrendous) evils? Van Inwagen’s response is 
that it would not have been a good thing unconditionally; but given the fact that 
human beings have separated themselves from God, it is a necessary means (for 
the purpose of reconciliation with God) that we experience fully the situation of 
being separated from God, and being a victim of purely random and meaningless 
evil is a constitutive part of “being separated from God.” Being the victim of 
purely random natural evils (in general) is not a good; it is an evil; but in God’s 
rescue plan after the Fall, it is an evil that can be a necessary (general) means to 
reach reconciliation with God. (Which, again, is not to say that any specific evil 
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is used as a means to anything: they are not; individual evils remain individually 
pointless.)
That seems to me to constitute a complete (and promising) theodicy of natural 
chance. And if this theodicy is our best solution to respond to the problem of evil, 
then a coarse-grained model of Providence (one in which some evils, including 
horrendous evils, are left by God to pure natural chance) might have a very strong 
dialectical advantage.
I, personally, find this theodicy interesting and promising, and I will not try to 
raise objections against it. My main question to professor Łukasiewicz is whether 
he would accept van Inwagen’s way to complete the theodicy of natural chance 
(i.e., van Inwagen’s response as to why God wants to preserve natural chance 
rather than intervene).
At the end of the day, I only feel perplexed by the fact that this theodicy, or 
rather this “defence” (since van Inwagen does not commit himself to the actual 
truth of the scenario), does not square easily with the Biblical picture of divine 
Providence, as I said above. For this reason, I would be inclined to continue look-
ing for a more Biblical response to the problem of evil.
CONCLUSION
Łukasiewicz’s paper is an extremely rich contribution to the philosophy and 
theology of divine providence. It is packed with responses to many different is-
sues, united by the project of drawing all the lessons there is to draw from the 
scientific data of chance in the natural world.
If I do not misinterpret him, Łukasiewicz’s conclusion in very general terms 
is that the data of chance do not prove the existence of God (the Fine-Tuning Ar-
gument does not work) but that they give us some amount of information about 
the nature of His providence (which cannot be conceived in a fine-grained way 
anymore, but has to be conceived in more coarse-grained terms).
In the first section I expressed some reservations about Łukasiewicz’s objec-
tion to the Fine-Tuning Argument. But I think this dialectical line is secondary in 
his project: the centre of his project (I believe) is the coarse-grained (or chance-
permitting) model of Providence.
Concerning this chance-permitting model of Providence, I have also expressed 
some (biblical) reservations, but at the end of the day, I think there is at least one 
strong argument in favour of it, namely its capacity to offer a promising theodicy 
(or defence). And I think it would be really fruitful to investigate in more depth 
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the connexions (and perhaps the differences) between Łukasiewicz’s theodicy of 
natural chance and van Inwagen’s theodicy of natural chance.
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DIVINE PROVIDENCE: FINE-GRAINED, COARSE-GRAINED,  
OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN? 
S u m m a r y
Dariusz Łukasiewicz has investigated in depth the “Argument from Chance” which argues that 
the data revealing chance in the world are incompatible with Divine Providence. Łukasiewicz agrees 
that these data undermine the traditional model of Providence—a fine-grained model in which every 
single detail is controlled by God—but maintains that they are not incompatible with a coarse-grained 
model—in which God leaves to chance many aspects of history (including some horrendous evils). 
Furthermore, Łukasiewicz provides independent reasons to prefer this coarse-grained model. Even 
though I agree that a maximally fine-grained model is undermined by the scientific data, I argue that 
this is no sufficient reason to adopt a model as coarse-grained as Łukasiewicz’s. I propose a model 
of intermediate level of fine-grainedness which could avoid the drawbacks of both extremes, and 
seems to me to provide a more traditional approach to the problem of evil.
Keywords: Divine Providence; problem of chance; probabilistic theism; theodicy of chance; gra-
tuitous evil.
BOŻA OPATRZNOŚĆ: SZCZEGÓŁOWA, OGÓLNA CZY POŚREDNIA? 
S t r e s z c z e n i e
W swoim eseju Dariusz Łukasiewicz analizuje szczegółowo „argument z przypadku”, zgodnie 
z którym dane wskazujące na istnienie w świecie przypadku są nie do pogodzenia z Opatrznością 
Bożą. Łukasiewicz akceptuje pogląd, że owe dane podważają tradycyjny model Opatrzności – model 
szczegółowy, w którym każdy najmniejszy szczegół jest kontrolowany przez Boga, twierdzi jednak, 
że nie są one niezgodne z modelem ogólnym, w którym Bóg pozostawia działaniu przypadku wiele 
aspektów dziejów świata (w tym również przypadki okropnego zła). Łukasiewicz podaje również nie-
zależne racje za przyjęciem tego modelu ogólnego. Chociaż zgadzam się, że dane pochodzące z nauk 
szczegółowych podważają model maksymalnie szczegółowy, argumentuję, że nie wystarczy to, aby 
przyjąć model aż tak ogólny, jak Łukasiewiczowy. Proponuję model pośredni, który pozwala uniknąć 
wad obu modeli skrajnych, a zarazem lepiej współgra z tradycyjnym podejściem do problemu zła.
Słowa kluczowe: Opatrzność; problem przypadku; teizm probabilistyczny; teodycea przypadku; 
daremne zło.
